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he case for not teaching syllogistic logic is easy to state: 
syllogistic logic is a superseded theory. Teaching Aristotle’s 
logic in the presence of modern mathematical logic is not quite 
as perverse as teaching his physics in the presence of modern physics, 
because syllogistic logic successfully identifies those valid arguments 
that fall within its scope (but as it is a monadic logic, its scope is 
rather narrow). Aristotle’s physics, on the other hand, is unsuccessful 
even within its proper bounds. Nevertheless, syllogistic logic has been 
overtaken by mathematical, polyadic logics, and some motivation 
must be given for according it a place in an overcrowded syllabus. 
This demand naturally raises the question of why we teach 
logic to philosophy students at all. Many of the familiar reasons do not 
tell strongly for or against syllogistic logic in comparison with modern 
logic. For example, it is important that students should get hold of the 
idea of a valid argument as such—but you can teach this notion with 
any logical system, ancient or modern. We should like philosophy 
students to understand that some arguments owe their validity solely 
T
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to their logical forms—but again, you can teach this using any system 
of formal logic, including syllogistic. What is more, one can teach 
these notions in a single lesson, so what is the rest of the module for? 
There is, in addition, the rather dubious claim that studying logic 
makes one a more careful thinker. Insofar as this is true, I am inclined 
to think that almost any rigorous discipline will achieve the same. 
Learning foreign languages in a relatively formal fashion probably 
does as much to improve students’ analytical nous as formal logic, if 
not more (what better way to develop a nose for equivocation than 
regularly translating between natural languages?). In any case, when 
we meet bad arguments in real life, the fallacies are almost never 
those errors of reasoning such as quantifier-shift that mathematical 
logic is uniquely equipped to expose, nor does one often find 
examples of illicit process or undistributed middle terms in newspaper 
columns. Informal fallacies such as equivocation, hasty induction or 
ad hominem attack are far more common, which is why those 
institutions that are seriously worried about their students’ analytical 
acumen tend to put on critical thinking courses rather than courses in 
formal logic. In short, the familiar reasons for teaching logic do not 
especially favour modern logic over the ancient. Indeed, syllogistic 
logic may be a better vehicle for teaching general notions such as 
validity and formality simply because many students find it easier than 
mathematical logic. 
One reason for teaching modern mathematical logic rather than 
syllogistic logic is to prepare students to participate in those 
philosophical research programmes that depend on it. It is, of course, 
one of the aims of an undergraduate degree to prepare students for 
postgraduate study, but not the only one. When philosophy is widely 
studied within modular schemes, only a tiny minority of philosophy 
undergraduates progresses to postgraduate work, and of these a yet 
smaller minority works on the sort of philosophy that demands 
mastery of modern logic. So this is only a weak reason for subjecting 
all philosophy undergraduates to extensive and possibly compulsory 
mathematical logic. 
So the case against teaching syllogistic logic is weak, but to 
justify making time for syllogistic in the syllabus we need some 
positive reasons for teaching it. These come in two groups: there are 
the benefits that arise from teaching syllogistic logic on its own, and 
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there are the benefits that arise from the contrast made available by 
teaching syllogistic and mathematical logic together. 
In the first group, there is the fact that the categorical sentences 
of syllogistic logic look like sentences of natural language. Those 
students who panic at the sight of a blackboard covered in 
mathematical symbols find syllogistic logic less intimidating. The 
force of this point really depends on the student body; where 
philosophy is taught as part of a humanities scheme, many of the 
students will have deliberately done no mathematics since GCSE. 
Recent years have seen a decline in mathematics in schools and a 
flight from most of the numerate disciplines in universities. 
Philosophers should take account of this. As mentioned already, 
syllogistic logic offers a way to achieve most of the general goals of 
logic teaching listed above with those students who simply would not 
cope with mathematical logic. 
Second, syllogistic offers two tests for validity: Venn diagrams 
and the theory of distribution. Having two tests for validity makes 
vivid and concrete the distinction between the concept of validity 
itself, and the means of testing for it. In mathematical logic, these can 
be obscured as students often learn by rote a technique for testing for 
validity, without really grasping the notion itself (they might, of 
course, learn more than one technique in mathematical logic too, but 
this is a much greater undertaking than learning both syllogistic 
techniques). 
A third motivation for teaching syllogistic logic arises from the 
historical character of philosophical training. Philosophy students are 
taught largely through the classic texts of the discipline, many of 
which predate mathematical logic. Those great dead philosophers who 
wrote before Frege and who placed logic near the centre of their 
philosophical projects are difficult to read unless one appreciates the 
shortcomings of the logic with which they were equipped. Consider, 
for example, Leibniz’s definition of truth, or Kant’s definition of 
analyticity. These definitions were supposed to encompass the whole 
of rational discourse, but they are cast in the impoverished logic of 
their times and are therefore restricted to its narrow scope (categorical 
statements and simple conditionals). This leaves our two historical 
rationalists struggling to get their basic philosophical machinery to 
work. These struggles make the texts less clear than they might 
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otherwise have been, and consequently, the relevant passages are 
barely intelligible unless one learns a bit of syllogistic logic first. If we 
are serious about getting students to read primary sources, we have to 
give them the means to make sense of them. For early modern 
rationalists, amongst others, that includes syllogistic logic. 
Further motivations appear when we consider the contrast 
between syllogistic and mathematical logics. With both kinds of logic 
in view, it is easy to raise the question of the existential import of 
universally-quantified sentences. Syllogistic logic usually takes it that 
if all S are P then there must be some Ss, while ( )PxSxx →∀  may be 
true even if there is no x such that Sx. In other words, syllogistic logic 
assumes that universally-quantified sentences do have existential 
import, while mathematical logic assumes that they do not. Natural-
language examples can push one’s intuitions either way, and this 
naturally leads to a discussion about the relation between ragged, 
unsystematic natural languages and perfectly tidy formal languages. 
This example helps students to see that the tidiness is achieved at the 
cost of some arbitrariness and insensitivity to particular cases. 
One of the weaknesses of many undergraduate modules in 
mathematical logic is that students are presented with just one logical 
system, and go away thinking that there is only one. There is no 
prospect of teaching so-called deviant logics as a matter of course, so 
students may imagine that the ‘correct’ analysis of the logical form of 
a sentence is unproblematic and philosophically uninteresting. At least 
if they learn syllogistic and mathematical logics together, they can see 
that there may be more than one way to analyse a given sentence. 
Tutors can use this to remove some of the authoritarian arbitrariness 
of logic teaching. To return to the example of existential import, some 
students will feel inclined to agree with Aristotle. We teachers of 
syllogistic logic don’t have to say, “I know you feel that ( )PxSxx →∀  
makes sense only if there are some Ss, but in this system it is true 
when there is no S, and this is the system you’ll be examined on, so 
shut up”. Of course, no-one would say anything quite like that, but the 
effect of teaching mathematical logic only can be the same. If students 
do not see their intuitions reflected anywhere in the syllabus, they 
become alienated from it. And for a teacher trying to make the 
conventions of mathematical logic seem plausible, it is tempting to 
brush unhelpful intuitions aside (as kindly as possible, needless to 
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say). With syllogistic in view, we can say, “Some great logicians of 
the past agreed with you about this, and that is why their system was 
set up thus. But the cost of assuming existential import for 
universally-quantified sentences is….” What were unhelpful intuitions 
are now the basis for a meta-logical discussion. 
Whenever possible, logic teachers should find and discuss 
respectable logicians who share the intuitions commonly experienced 
by students. Otherwise students may feel that their objections to some 
of the arbitrariness of logical theory have been ignored rather than 
answered. To conclude, let me give another example of this. The 
traditional square of oppositions divides categorical sentences thus:  
 
Fig. 1 Square of Opposition 
 
This can conflict with natural intuitions because for good 
Gricean reasons, ‘Some S are P’ normally entails that some S are not 
P. Otherwise, one would say ‘All S are P’, or ‘As far as we know, all 
S are P’. It may be significant here that natural languages do not have 
single words to refer to the bottom right-hand corner, the particular 
All S are P No S are P 
Some S are not P 
Contraries
Sub-Contraries
Contradictories
Contradictories
Entails
Entails
Some S are P 
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negative. Perhaps instead of a square of opposition there should be a 
triangle of contraries: 
 
 
Fig 2. Triangle of Contraries 
 
 
This though is a rather impoverished basis for logic. Instead, 
the French logician Robert Blanché proposed a hexagon of 
oppositions, formed from the traditional square by adding ‘Some S are 
P and some S are not P’ at the bottom and ‘All S are P or No S are P’ 
at the top (‘Sur l’opposition des concepts’ Theoria vol. 19 (1953) 
pp. 89-130). There is no need to explore this idea in detail; a mention 
of it will reassure students that their natural intuitions are not silly or 
evidence of a lack of talent for logic. On the contrary, the student who 
spontaneously sniffs out the oddness of saying ‘Some S are P’ and 
meaning ‘Some, possibly all, S are P’ is to be praised. 
Finally, let me offer some evidence that syllogistic logic is 
intellectually interesting as well as pedagogically and historically 
useful. Another French logician, Jean-Yves Béziau, has taken 
Blanché’s hexagonal model and generalised it to include modal 
operators and non-standard forms of negation (para-consistent and 
para-complete). This gives him enough hexagons to create a stellar 
All S are P No S are P 
Some S are P and Some S are not P 
Contraries
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dodecahedron of oppositions. This is tantamount to a representation 
theorem for modal logic in solid geometry. As a result, relationships 
between modal logics can be modelled using coloured sticks and blobs 
of putty. 
